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Every problem contains the seeds of its own solution. 
—Stanley Arnold 
I. INTRODUCTION 
General liability insurance carriers and policyholders have long 
wrestled with how to apportion the damages from claims involving 
bodily injury or property damage happening over long time spans, such 
as asbestos bodily injury and environmental property damage claims.  
Such claims are often called “long-tail” claims.  Often, the cause and 
progression of injury or damage involved in such claims is not easy to 
determine.  Policyholders, however, generally have the burden to prove 
that a loss “triggers” an insurance policy, i.e., that at least some injury or 
damage leading to the damages for which the policyholder seeks 
coverage took place during the periods of the relevant policy.1  Many 
courts have recognized that this burden can be difficult or impossible to 
meet for these types of claims.2  This fact has led many courts to accord a 
presumption to the policyholder that the injury or damage is continuous.3  
Under this presumption, the injury or damage is deemed to have begun at 
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 1.  See infra Part IV. 
 2.  See infra Part IV. 
 3.  See Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 819 A.2d 410, 415 (N.J. 2003) 
(recognizing that “a growing number of states [] have adopted the continuous trigger theory”). 
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some appropriate point (such as the date of first exposure to asbestos in 
asbestos bodily injury claims, or the date that the polluting operations 
began in pollution property damage claims) and then to have happened 
continuously until some other appropriate date (such as the date of 
diagnosis or death in asbestos claims, or the date on which the cleanup is 
complete in pollution claims).4 
Once courts resolve the trigger of coverage issue through the 
presumption of continuous injury or damage, the question becomes who 
should pay for what portions of the relevant damages.  In the typical type 
of claim, there is little doubt as to the date on which injury or damage 
happened.  Accordingly, typical claims generally do not raise issues 
regarding which insurance policy covers the claim, if any (so long as 
concurrent insurance, which is insurance covering the same time period, 
is not involved).  However, with respect to long-tail claims, there often is 
no actual evidence of damage or injury during the policy period, let alone 
evidence of how much injury or damage happened in any given period.  
In this context, insurers and policyholders have locked horns over the 
appropriate method for allocating liability for these claims. 
With some exceptions, many insurers take the position that the plain 
language in these policies limits the scope of coverage to only those 
damages that the policyholder is liable to pay because of injury or 
damage happening during the policy period.  These carriers point out that 
the continuous injury or damage trigger provides no basis for concluding 
that any more or less injury or damage took place in any one part of the 
continuous trigger period than another.  Accordingly, to honor the plain 
meaning of the contract language, these insurers assert that the only 
legitimate method for allocating liability for these claims is to prorate the 
damages by spreading them evenly across the entire presumptive period 
of continuous injury or damage.  This approach is generally known as 
“pro rata allocation.”5 
Most policyholders take a different view.  Naturally, their goal is to 
maximize recovery under their insurance programs.  In pursuing this 
goal, however, policyholders often take contradictory positions. 
                                                 
 4.  See, e.g., Lincoln Elec. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 672, 689–90 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (explaining that the continuous injury trigger theory creates a rebuttable presumption that 
all policies in effect from exposure to the manifestation are triggered); Broderick Inv. Co. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D. Colo. 1989) (adopting continuous 
trigger method and finding that each policy issued during the period that damage occurred was 
triggered). 
 5.  See infra notes 51–60 and accompanying text. 
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Historically, policyholders have argued that the only legitimate way 
to apportion damages under general liability policies is to apply a 
contractual version of joint and several liability, generally known in the 
insurance context as “all sums” liability.6  In arguing for this approach, 
policyholders often point to the prior insurance and non-cumulation of 
liability clauses (non-cumulation clauses) that are often found in 
commercial general liability (CGL) policies.  These clauses generally 
provide that the limits of liability under a policy are reduced by the sums 
due under any prior insurance policies that insure the same loss.  
Policyholders argue that, because these clauses refer to the possibility 
that earlier and later policies might cover the same loss, the existence of 
these clauses proves that insurers always have understood that CGL 
policies cover damages arising from bodily injury or property damage 
happening outside their policy periods. 
Over the years, all sums liability has gained some traction with 
courts in certain jurisdictions.  Now, policyholders and their advocates, 
who had previously used these non-cumulation clauses to obtain all sums 
rulings, seek to avoid the consequences of the application of these same 
clauses in the all sums context.  One key premise of this argument is that 
the non-cumulation clauses resulted from the transition in the 1960s from 
CGL policies that insured “accidents” to policies insuring “occurrences.”  
The earlier, accident-based policies were triggered when the “accident,” 
or the event causing the relevant injury or damage, happened during the 
policy period.7  Under the newer occurrence-based policies, it was the 
injury or damage itself, rather than its cause, that had to take place during 
the policy period to trigger coverage.8  Thus, the transition from 
accident-based to occurrence-based policies raised the possibility that 
both an earlier accident-based policy and a later occurrence-based policy 
would cover the same loss.  Policyholders are now using this historical 
context to argue that the non-cumulation clause only applies in this 
situation and does not apply in the all sums context. 
In a 2011 article, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other 
Insurance” Clause by Another Name, Christopher C. French seeks to use 
this argument to avoid the impact of non-cumulation clauses in those 
                                                 
 6.  See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  The authors note that these generalizations are not substitutes for an analysis of the relevant 
policy language at issue in a particular case.  For instance, and by way of example only, in their 
practice the authors have encountered some policies that require both the injury or damage and the 
occurrence—the cause of the injury or damage—to happen during the policy period to trigger 
coverage. 
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jurisdictions that have accepted all sums liability.9  Mr. French asserts 
that the archetypal non-cumulation clause, drafted in the 1960s, was 
intended solely to address the accident-to-occurrence transition.  
According to Mr. French, the sole purpose of the clause was to avoid 
situations in which an insurer had to pay under both an earlier, accident-
based policy (because the cause of the injury or damage happened during 
its policy period) and under a later, occurrence-based policy (because the 
resultant injury or damage happened during that policy period).  The 
drafters, Mr. French claims, did not anticipate later developments in 
insurance law, such as all sums liability or the continuous trigger 
theory.10  Accordingly, Mr. French maintains, the non-cumulation clause 
is “hopelessly ambiguous” and is nothing more than a rebranded “other 
insurance” provision.11 
Mr. French’s article and the arguments it raises reflect the belated 
realization by policyholders that they may have thrown out the baby with 
the bathwater when they argued that the non-cumulation clause supports 
all sums liability.  The problem, from the policyholder’s perspective, is 
that the application of the non-cumulation clause under an all sums 
regime may, in some circumstances, actually reduce a policyholder’s 
insurance recoveries to a sum lower than it would recover under the pro 
rata allocation approach. 
However, by its plain language, the non-cumulation clause applies in 
the all sums context.  Even considering its historical origins, the 
language of the non-cumulation provision plainly applies to any situation 
in which earlier and later general liability policies apply to the same loss.  
If these clauses were intended to apply only to the narrow situation that 
Mr. French identifies, they would have been much more narrowly 
crafted. 
Through their advocacy, policyholders have persuaded some courts 
to create a liability framework under the all sums approach that is closely 
analogous, if not identical, to precisely the situation that gave rise to the 
need for non-cumulation clauses in the first place.  Accordingly, the 
situation under the all sums framework falls squarely within the scope of 
these clauses.  Therefore, policyholders must now lie in the bed they 
made: non-cumulation clauses, which policyholders have used to achieve 
in some jurisdictions the all sums result they desire, do and should apply 
                                                 
 9.  60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375 (2011). 
 10.  Id. at 387. 
 11.  Id. at 404. 
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in the all sums context.  If they do not, then they are irrelevant to the all 
sums versus pro rata liability dispute in the first instance. 
This Article proposes that policyholders apply non-cumulation 
clauses erratically and inconsistently.  Section II discusses some of the 
characteristics of long-tail claims and the difficulties involved in 
pinpointing how much of the injury or damage giving rise to such claims 
happened in any particular time period.  Section III recounts the 
evolution of the standard CGL policy.  Section IV summarizes two 
competing methods for assigning liability for long-tail claims, both 
among insurers and as between insurers and policyholders: pro rata 
allocation and all sums liability.  Section V summarizes policyholders’ 
use of the non-cumulation clause in CGL policies to persuade certain 
courts to adopt the all sums liability approach.  Section VI summarizes 
and rebuts key arguments made in Mr. French’s article, The “Non-
Cumulation Clause”: An “Other Insurance” Clause by Another Name.  
Finally, Section VII sets forth arguments supporting the conclusion that 
the non-cumulation clause is unambiguous and should apply in the all 
sums context. 
II. LONG-TAIL CLAIMS 
A. The Concept of Long-Tail Claims 
Consider a scenario in which a hypothetical corporation, ABC Corp., 
has conducted manufacturing operations at a site from 1950 to 1980.  A 
score of different carriers issued occurrence-based policies with 
consecutive policy periods to ABC Corp.  In this hypothetical, waste 
escaped ABC Corp.’s facility in 1950 and leached into adjacent 
groundwater shortly after operations began.  This groundwater 
contamination continued until 1980, when ABC Corp. learned of the 
contamination and ceased operations.  This pollution, which 
progressively contaminated the environment throughout this period, 
resulted in ABC Corp. being liable for millions of dollars in government-
mandated cleanup and pollution monitoring costs.  Moreover, ABC 
Corp. faces tens of millions of dollars in liability to individuals who 
suffered bodily injury, property damage, or both, as a result of exposure 
to the contaminated groundwater during the operations period and long 
after operations ceased. 
ABC Corp.’s liabilities result from bodily injury and property 
damage happening over more than three decades.  Assuming no coverage 
defense applies, which of ABC Corp.’s liability insurers must bear the 
cost of these liabilities?  To maximize its recovery, ABC Corp.’s risk 
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managers will seek to recover under each general liability policy in effect 
throughout the pollution period, contending that the relevant damage and 
injury triggers all policies issued during the pollution period. 
B. Primary Types of Long-Tail Claims 
The above hypothetical illustrates a hallmark of long-tail claims: the 
delay, or latency period, between the causal event and the manifestation 
of injury or damage resulting from that event.  The most common types 
of long-tail claims are toxic exposure (usually asbestos) and 
environmental contamination claims. 
Asbestos-related disease claims are perhaps the most common long-
tail bodily injury claims.12  The versatility of asbestos led to its 
widespread use in industry and commerce, particularly in construction.13  
Asbestos use began in the 1860s and rapidly expanded.14  Asbestos fibers 
can become airborne and lodge in the lungs when inhaled.15  Certain 
types of asbestos have been proven to cause cancer and various 
pulmonary diseases when inhaled.16  These diseases take a long time to 
develop; it often requires years of asbestos inhalation for the disease to 
develop, and symptoms generally manifest years after exposure ceases.17  
                                                 
 12.  See, e.g., Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Equitas Ltd., 969 N.E.2d 187, 189 (N.Y. 2012) 
(asbestos claims “surface long after the policy period”). 
 13.  See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(noting that asbestos possesses a high tensile strength and flexibility and withstands high 
temperatures, such that it is conducive to many commercial uses). 
 14.  See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 735–39 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 
1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) (providing a comprehensive historical background of 
asbestos use and the discovery of its detrimental health effects). 
 15.  See, e.g., id. at 737 (discussing the expected peak of asbestos-related deaths in the 1990s 
and 2000s due to embedded asbestos particles in millions of workers’ lungs).  
 16.  See id. at 737–42 (referencing asbestos-induced detrimental health effects like 
mesothelioma, bronchogenic carcinoma, and asbestosis).  
 17.  See A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Mass. Insurers Insolvency Fund, 838 N.E.2d 1237, 1251 n.11 
(Mass. 2005) (“Because the injurious effects of asbestos may not be apparent, or capable of medical 
diagnosis, for many years after initial exposure, the questions ‘what is bodily injury’ and ‘when does 
it occur’ often assume primary importance in insurance coverage disputes involving asbestos.”); In 
re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., No. C–0063–03, 2012 WL 1314181, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Apr. 18, 2012) (noting that injury from asbestos exposure is not “quick to manifest, but instead, 
may remain unrecognized for substantial periods of time, thereby rendering uncertain the ultimate 
liability that will accrue to an insured”); Jamaica D. Potts & Kenneth S. Rivlin, Not So Fast: The 
Sealed Air Asbestos Settlement and Methods of Risk Management in the Acquisition of Companies 
with Asbestos Liabilities, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 626, 631–32 (2003) (explaining that mesothelioma, 
a fatal cancer of the outer lung and chest cavity caused by prolonged inhalation of asbestos, may 
occur up to forty years after exposure to asbestos fibers). 
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This latency period often implicates decades’ worth of CGL policies, 
long after they were issued and their policy periods ended. 
Environmental contamination claims present the same sort of 
continuous injury and delay in manifestation as asbestos-related long-tail 
claims present.  Environmental contamination frequently entails damage 
occurring over an extended period that triggers multiple policies issued 
over a period of years or decades.18  The fact that such damage is 
happening may go unrecognized or ignored for much of the pollution 
period.  The hypothetical scenario described above is typical of such 
claims. 
With respect to these long-tail claims, it is generally necessary to 
answer three questions to efficiently and equitably apportion liability 
among multiple insurers and between the insurers and the policyholder. 
First, when did the injury or damage commence?  Second, when did the 
injury or damage cease?  Third, and most crucially, what is the amount 
of injury or damage that happened in each year?19  Unfortunately, with 
regard to the third of these basic questions, it is inherently difficult (and 
often impossible) to quantify what portion of continuing injury or 
damage spanning several decades took place in any given year.20  Yet 
policyholders, insurers and, ultimately, the courts have to resolve these 
questions, and the financial consequences of the answers are often 
immense.21 
                                                 
 18.  See Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Nos. L–0619–09, L–
1004–09, 2011 WL 2671583, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 11, 2011) (“The problem with 
environmental contamination claims is that the damage that triggers insurance liability will not occur 
due to a single event, but ‘usually is attributable to events that begin, develop and intensify over a 
sustained period of time [and] [t]herefore, the damages ha[ve] occurred or been triggered along a 
continuous timeline during which several successive policies issued to the insured were in effect.’”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Quincy Mut. Fire. Ins. Co. v. Borough of Bellmawr, 172 N.J. 409, 
416–17 (2002)). 
 19.  See Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive 
Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 258 (1997) (alluding to the scientific impossibilities in 
allocating liability to each policy in long-tail claims for injuries happening only within each insurer’s 
respective policy period); William R. Hickman & Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation of Environmental 
Cleanup Liability Between Successive Insurers, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 291, 292 (1990) (deeming it 
“virtually impossible” to correlate degrees of damage to particular policies where successive policies 
are implicated); James F. Hogg, The Tale of a Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515, 525–26 (1998) 
(describing how claims for progressive injury have raised questions of proof as to when the injury 
occurred, how long the injury continued, and whether there was a single occurrence or multiple 
occurrences). 
 20.  See Doherty, supra note 19, at 257–58 (observing that many injuries occur over long 
periods of time, making it sometimes scientifically or administratively impossible to allocate 
damages to multiple insurance policies). 
 21.  See id. at 258–59, 265.  
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III. THE CGL POLICY AND THE STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL 
INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
The CGL policy was introduced in January 1941 in response to the 
increasingly urgent need to make insurance less variable.22  Accordingly, 
the CGL policy was created to insure, under a single policy, many of the 
types of liability exposure arising from a policyholder’s locations and 
business activities.23  CGL insurance typically requires the insurer to 
defend the policyholder in suits arising from potentially insured losses (at 
the primary insurance level), and to indemnify the policyholder for 
damages resulting from such losses.24  CGL policies were crafted so as to 
insure legal liability stemming from various types of conduct unless 
excluded.25  Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, considerable changes were 
made to key phrases, terms, and exclusions in the basic CGL policy 
form.26  Standard CGL policies initially insured only bodily injury 
liability.  However, over time, property damage liability also came to be 
included.27 
The allure of CGL policies stemmed from their general uniformity; a 
generally standardized “form” policy, which applied to a wide variety of 
business ventures, had the potential to increase efficiency and to enable 
insurers to rely on the courts’ uniform interpretation of the same policy 
language in evaluating risk.28  Because they were designed to address a 
wide variety of business risks and liabilities, the CGL policy necessarily 
employed generic language.29  Over time, policyholders would seek to 
exploit this feature by advocating various interpretations to support 
findings of ambiguity in order to expand the scope of coverage.30 
                                                 
 22.  George B. Flanigan, CGL Policies of 1941 to 1966: Origins of Product Liability, CPCU 
EJOURNAL, Aug. 2005, at 1, 1; see also Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. 
Supp. 1485, 1500–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing 
the origin and purpose of general liability policies, which evolved “out of the difficulties faced by 
courts and parties in dealing with personal injuries and property damage sustained as a result of 
gradual processes”). 
 23.  James A. Robertson, How Umbrella Policies Started Part 2: The First Umbrella Forms, 
IRMI (Apr. 2000), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2000/robertson04.aspx?. 
 24.  Sharon M. Murphy, The “Sudden and Accidental” Exception to the Pollution Exclusion 
Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of Environmental 
Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 163–64 (1992). 
 25.  See generally Robertson, supra note 23. 
 26.  See generally Flanigan, supra note 22. 
 27.  Robertson, supra note 23. 
 28.  Murphy, supra note 24, at 164. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See, e.g., Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Packer, 60 F.3d 1116, 1121 (4th Cir. 1995)  (“An 
ambiguity does not exist simply because terms are not defined in the policy.”); E. Associated Coal 
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Before 1966, CGL policies employed an “accident” trigger.  Under 
the accident trigger, the accident (the cause of the injury or damage 
leading to liability) must happen during the policy period for the policy 
to potentially cover liability arising from the accident (subject to other 
policy provisions).  The insuring agreements in these pre-1966 policies 
typically contained language resembling the following: 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall 
become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by 
law, or assumed by him under contract as defined herein, for damages, 
including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily 
injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting there-
from, sustained by any person or persons and caused by accident.31 
Moreover, these accident-based policies often contained “Policy 
Period/Territory” provisions or other contract language explicitly 
limiting coverage to accidents taking place during the applicable policy 
periods.32 
Thereafter, this language was subjected to recurring judicial scrutiny.  
Since the policy did not define the term “accident,” much of this scrutiny 
centered on whether an accident had to be a “sudden” event, or whether 
it could be gradual or progressive.33  One of the more troubling aspects 
for courts interpreting the pre-1966 accident-based policies was 
determining whether injuries or property damage caused by gradual 
events or processes were caused by “accidents.”34 
                                                                                                                       
 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) (“A court should not torture the 
language of the policy in order to create ambiguities.”); Consol. Edison Co. v. United Coastal Ins. 
Co., 628 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. 1995) (“The court should not find the language ambiguous on the basis 
of the interpretation urged by one party, where that interpretation would ‘strain the contract language 
beyond its reasonable and ordinary meaning.” (quoting Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Progressive Cas. 
Ins. Co., 775 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 31.  See Flanigan, supra note 22 (providing sample form language of early CGL policies); 
Hogg, supra note 19, at 526 (discussing the evolution of CGL policies from accident-based to 
occurrence-based). 
 32.  See, e.g., Kirkham, Michael & Assocs. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 493 F.2d 475, 476 (8th Cir. 
1974) (“This policy applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Protex-A-Kar Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 227 P.2d 509, 
510–11 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (same); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, 848 A.2d 715, 723 (N.H. 2004), aff’d, 452 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2006) (same). 
 33.  James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate Over 
the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 633 (1997) (discussing courts’ construction 
and interpretation of “accident,” such that an accident was often required to constitute a sudden 
event with occasional exceptions for incremental, progressive losses); Hogg, supra note 19, at 527 
(discussing whether an accident had to be a “sudden and episodic event”). 
 34.  Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500–01 (S.D.N.Y. 
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In response, the Insurance Services Office (ISO)35 revised the 
standard liability form in 1966, creating an “occurrence-” based policy 
that subsumed the concept of an “accident” within the occurrence 
definition to provide greater clarity regarding coverage for gradual, 
progressive losses.36  Accordingly, the standard CGL policy 
subsequently incorporated the following language into its 1966 insuring 
agreement, which is the key provision in CGL policies that spells out the 
basic scope of coverage: “The Company will pay on behalf of the 
Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this 
insurance applies caused by an occurrence . . . .” 
In 1966, “[o]ccurrence” was defined to mean: “an accident, including 
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period 
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the Insured.”37 
ISO’s 1973 revisions to the CGL policy further clarified the temporal 
limitations within the policies.  The insuring agreement from the 1973 
CGL policy form reads as follows: “We will pay those sums that the 
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of  ‘bodily 
injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies . . . .”38  The 
occurrence definition was further revised in 1973 to include “continuous 
or repeated exposure to conditions,” thereby attempting to eliminate any 
residual concerns that arose from the use of the term “accident.”39 
Moreover, ISO’s 1973 revisions to the CGL policy moved the 
requirement that the injury or damage occur during the policy period to 
be covered from the “occurrence” definition to the “bodily injury” and 
“property damage” definitions, as follows: 
                                                                                                                       
 
1983), aff’d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 35.  The ISO is the entity responsible for overseeing revisions to the CGL coverage form and 
making it available for use by individual insurance companies.  See INTERNAL RISK MGMT. INST., 
INC., IRMI ON COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 13 (2009), http://www.webce.com/pdf/IRMI_C 
GL_V3.pdf. 
 36.  See Fischer, supra note 33, at 633; Hogg, supra note 19, at 527–28. 
 37.  See Fischer, supra note 33, at 634 n.29 (emphasis added) (quoting John J. Tarpey, The New 
Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS. COUN. J. 223, 223 (1966)). 
 38.  Fischer, supra note 33, at 633, n.28. 
 39.  Hogg, supra note 19, at 529. 
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“[B]odily injury” [means] bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained 
by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at 
any time resulting therefrom.40 
“Property damage” means (1) physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property which occurs during the policy period, including the 
loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom . . . .41 
Thus, using the property damage definition as an example (and 
eliminating the “loss of use” language from the definition), the insuring 
agreement reads as follows when the definition is plugged in where the 
defined phrase appears: 
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
[physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs 
during the policy period] to which this insurance applies, caused by an 
occurrence.42 
Additionally, many of these policies include a provision specifying that 
the policies only cover bodily injury or property damage that occurs 
during the policy period.43  Thus, under their plain language, these 
policies insure damages because of injury or damage happening during 
the policy period.44 
Occurrence-based policies proved enticing to policyholders seeking 
coverage for asbestos or environmental contamination claims.  In the 
context of these claims, the latency period has enabled policyholders to 
                                                 
 40.  In re Wallace & Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 834 (4th Cir. 2004).  
 41.  Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 20 (3d Cir. 1985).  
 42.  Sandoz, Inc. v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.J. 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
 43.  See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 546, 547 (D. Conn. 
1986); Sandoz, Inc., 554 F. Supp. at 259. 
 44.  See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224–25 (6th Cir. 
1980) (stating that policies indemnify for liability incurred as a result of an accident or occurrence 
that occurs during, not outside, the policy period); Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 
A.2d 107, 121 (Conn. 2003) (“Neither the insurers nor the insured could reasonably have expected 
that the insurers would be liable for losses occurring in periods outside of their respective policy 
coverage periods.”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 695 
(N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he policies provide indemnification for liability incurred as a result of an accident 
or occurrence during the policy period, not outside that period.”); 6B J. APPLEMAN & J.A. 
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4254, at 26–27 (Rev. ed. 1979) (explaining that 
insurance policies insure against the risk that the insured will be held liable for injury or damage 
during the policy period, and do not insure against all risks per se); 7 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 102:2 (3d ed. 1995) (“It is a time-honored principle that the insurer’s obligation to pay 
is contingent on a covered loss occurring during the policy period.”). 
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seek coverage under their historical occurrence-based liability policies, 
even though the injury or damage manifested decades after the relevant 
policy periods ended.45  The courts found it difficult to consistently 
interpret the term “occurrence” and to gauge the nature and extent of 
complex losses involving claims made decades after the cause of the 
injury or damage in question took place.  This problem, among others, 
led to the development of “claims-made” policies in the 1980s.46 
IV. APPORTIONING LIABILITY FOR LONG-TAIL CLAIMS 
Naturally, policyholders seeking coverage for long-tail claims have 
urged the courts to interpret the CGL policy language so as to maximize 
coverage.  In connection with the 1966 and 1973 ISO forms, they 
generally do this by emphasizing the prefatory phrase “all sums,” found 
at the beginning of the insuring agreements in these forms, while 
ignoring the rest of the insuring agreements and the definitions of the 
relevant terms it contains, in violation of fundamental contract 
construction principles.47 
The policyholder usually bears the burden of proving that the 
damages for which it seeks coverage fall within the scope of the insuring 
agreement.48  As part of that burden, the policyholder must prove that the 
                                                 
 45.  See, e.g., John M. Sylvester, Insurance Coverage for Long-Tail Liabilities: Recent Trends 
and Concerns, in INSURANCE LAW 2012, at 61 (Aspatore 2012), available at 2012 WL 697231, at *1 
(“For example, a claimant who has just been diagnosed with mesothelioma  . . . may assert a claim 
against a company, alleging exposure to asbestos involving the company’s products or premises that 
may have commenced thirty to forty years ago, or more.  Companies that are confronted with such 
long-tail liabilities have taken some comfort in the fact that they . . . had purchased historical liability 
insurance policies on an ‘occurrence’ basis in earlier decades that specifically provided coverage for 
these types of liabilities.”). 
 46.  Although beyond the scope of this Article, claims-made policies gradually eclipsed the 
occurrence-based policies that had reigned throughout much of the evolution of the standard general 
liability (GL) policy.  See generally Fischer, supra note 33 (discussing the evolution of claims-made 
policies and their implications). 
 47.  See, e.g., Galgano v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 838 A.2d 993, 997 (Conn. 2004) (noting 
that although ambiguities in a policy are to be construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured, where policy language is plain, courts cannot “indulge in a forced construction ignoring 
provisions or so distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by the 
parties”); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Aon Corp., 812 N.E.2d 369, 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“By injecting 
‘commercial’ into the [policy provision], the written language supplied and the risks contemplated in 
writing the policy would be supplanted and distorted unnecessarily, creating an unintended class of 
insureds.”); Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 865 N.E.2d 1168, 1172 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
(“To adopt the interpretation advocated by the [insureds] would distort the plain meaning of the 
clause and is contrary to what an ‘objectively reasonable insured, reading the relevant policy 
language, would expect to be covered.’” (quoting New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 667 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996))). 
 48.  See, e.g., Rotella v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 3:08-CV-0486-G, 2008 WL 2694754, at 
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damages for which it seeks coverage are because of injury or damage 
taking place during the policy period.49  However, when the claim at 
issue involves injury or damage spanning multiple policy periods, 
determining which policies should pay for what portion of the injury or 
damage presents substantial difficulties.  It is often difficult or 
impossible to determine how much injury or damage took place during 
any given period, and one often cannot identify precisely when the injury 
or damage began and ended.50  Accordingly, courts have landed upon 
different approaches to apportioning liability for these claims.  The two 
primary competing approaches are (1) pro rata by “time on the risk” 
allocation and (2) “all sums,” or joint and several liability. 
Pro rata allocation relieves policyholders of their burden to prove the 
precise amount of injury or damage that happened in each policy period 
while honoring the insuring agreements in these policies.51  In essence, 
pro rata by time on the risk divides the total damages by the number of 
years during which injury or damage took place and allocates the 
resulting sum to each year.52  Thus, the policies in each year are 
                                                                                                                       
 
*3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2008) (noting that the insured bears the burden of proving that the claimed 
damages occurred during the policy period); Port Auth. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 
563, 582 (D.N.J. 2001) (“The insured bears the burden of demonstrating physical damage or loss 
manifesting within the pertinent policy period in order to demonstrate a relevant loss.”); St. 
Michael’s Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1986) (noting that the insured has the burden of proving that a loss falls within the terms of 
the policy); Harford Cnty. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 295 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) 
(“The burden to show that property damage occurred within the coverage of the policies is . . . upon 
the insured.”); Ratner v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 269 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Mass. 1971) (accepting 
as a general principle that plaintiff seeking to recover for breach of insurance policy agreement 
“must allege and prove the cause of action is within the contract’s terms”); Am. States Ins. Co. v. 
Mathis, 974 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the policyholder has the burden of 
showing that a policy covers the loss and damages at issue and that the insurer must show the 
applicability of any exclusions); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Travelers Grp., Inc., 702 N.Y.S.2d 
60, 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (same), aff’d as modified, 743 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) 
(mem.); Garrett v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 128 S.E.2d 171, 173 (S.C. 1962) (same); Kozlik v. Gulf Ins. 
Co., 673 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (the policyholder must prove that the damages at 
issue fall within the scope of the insuring agreements). 
 49.  See Rotella, 2008 WL 2694754, at *3 (stating that the insured must show the cause of 
action arose within the policy’s scope of coverage). 
 50.  See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 748 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1996) (discussing when insurance coverage is triggered in asbestos cases); Benjamin Moore & 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 843 A.2d 1094, 1102–03 (N.J. 2004) (discussing coverage of a single 
occurrence with multiple-year effects); Soc’y Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 607 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Wis. 
2000) (discussing the “exposure” and “continuous trigger” theories in determining when a policy is 
triggered). 
 51.  See Doherty, supra note 19, at 278–79 (discussing the insurer’s liability under pro rata 
coverage). 
 52.  See, e.g., id. at 281. 
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responsible for the damages allocated to that year, and only those 
damages.53  This allocation approach is easy to administer.  A court need 
only determine the total in damages and the period of time over which 
the injury or damage happened.54  Moreover, the pro rata method permits 
any party to seek to rebut the presumption that the injury or damage 
happened evenly over the relevant period, if that party concludes that it 
can prove a more accurate amount of injury or damage that took place in 
a particular period.55 
Thus, pro rata allocation holds insurers responsible only for the 
damages arising from that portion of the injury or damage that is 
reasonably presumed to have happened during their policy periods.56  
This approach both honors the contract language and is inherently 
equitable. 57  With an “intuitive, common sense appeal,” the simplicity of 
pro rata allocation promotes judicial efficiency.58  The approach also 
minimizes needless litigation costs by eliminating the need for follow-on, 
protracted, and complex contribution litigation among insurers.59  
Several jurisdictions have adopted pro rata allocation in light of its 
deference to the policy language.60 
                                                 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224–25 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (allowing any party to prove specific years of exposure); Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 121 (Conn. 2003); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
670 N.E.2d 740, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 
312 (Mass. 2009); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998), aff’d, 617 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2000).  
 56.  See Boston Gas Co., 910 N.E.2d at 353 (describing pro rata allocation “as a trigger of 
coverage and as a limitation on the promised ‘all sums’ coverage”). 
 57.  See Arco Indus., 594 N.W.2d at 69–70 (discussing the intent of drafters of CGL policies to 
provide coverage for the policy period alone and not for damages arising prior or subsequent to this 
period).  
 58.  Doherty, supra note 19, at 282. 
 59.  Id. at 271. 
 60.  See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mo. Elec. Coop., 278 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2000); Spartan Petroleum Co. v. 
Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1998); Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. 
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 371–73 (5th Cir. 1993); Commercial Union Ins. 
Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985); Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1224–25; Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 939–40 (Colo. 1999); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 
A.2d at 123; Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 918 (Haw. 1994); 
Outboard Marine Corp., 670 N.E.2d at 748; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. 
Co., 71 P.3d 1097, 1134 (Kan. 2003); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 
842 (Ky. 2005); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 201, 297–98 (La. Ct. App. 
2003); Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 1101–04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); 
Boston Gas Co., 910 N.E.2d at 312; Arco Indus., 594 N.W.2d at 69; N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & 
Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662–64 (Minn. 1994); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., Cause No. 
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In contrast, the all sums approach potentially holds each triggered 
policy responsible for the entirety of the damages, regardless of how 
much of the injury or damage giving rise to those damages happened 
during its policy period (subject to the policy limits).61  The inequity of 
this approach is apparent.  For instance, under this approach a single 
insurer, providing only one year of insurance, can be required to shoulder 
damages arising from injury or damage happening over the course of 
years or decades.62  This is true even if the relevant injury or damage 
began only during the last minute of an insurer’s policy period.  The all 
sums approach also often requires insurers to cover periods during which 
the policyholder elected not to obtain insurance, or to self-insure, or 
chose to obtain insurance from a carrier that subsequently became 
insolvent, an outcome often criticized by courts.63  The all sums approach 
ignores the policy language and requires policies to pay for damages 
incurred because of injury or damage that happened well before and well 
after their policy periods.64  At bottom, all sums permits policyholders to 
“rewrite” their insurance contracts in order to unilaterally expand the 
scope of coverage. 
Those arguing for the all sums approach often claim that insurers are 
better situated to bear the entirety of the loss and seek contribution from 
each other.65  However, all sums imposes broader costs and burdens.  For 
                                                                                                                       
 
05CC-001214 (Mo. Cir. Ct. of St. Louis Cnty. Nov. 8, 2012); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 
778 N.W.2d 433, 445 (Neb. 2010); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 527 (N.H. 2007); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 993–95 
(N.J. 1994); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 694–95 (N.Y. 
2002); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140–42 (Utah 1997); Towns v. 
N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1167 (Vt. 2008).  
 61.  See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding 
insurance company liable in full despite the possibility that the insured’s disease developed outside 
the policy period). 
 62.  Doherty, supra note 19, at 271. 
 63.  See, e.g., Olin, 221 F.3d at 324 (“Olin, paying no premiums to INA, was either uninsured 
or self-insured.  Allocation is appropriate to prevent Olin from imposing liability on INA for injuries 
that occurred during those periods and arose largely from accidents during these periods in which 
Olin was not paying for coverage.”); Pub. Serv. Co., 986 P.2d at 940 (“[T]here is no logic to support 
the notion that one single insurance policy among 20 or 30 years worth of policies could be expected 
to be held liable for the entire time period.  Nor is it reasonable to expect that a single-year policy 
would be liable, for example, if the insured carried no insurance at all for the other years covered by 
the occurrence.”). 
 64.  See Arco Indus., 594 N.W.2d at 69 (rejecting an all sums approach that would unfairly 
require the carrier to pay for damages occurring outside the policy period, and thereby contravene 
explicit policy language). 
 65.  See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 403 P.2d 129, 132 (Cal. 1965); 
Kuhn v. Grant Cnty., 439 P.2d 155, 162 (Kan. 1968). 
716 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
instance, an insurer that is forced to bear the entirety of a loss arising 
from decades of injury or damage must seek contribution from other 
insurers in separate lawsuits, leading to unnecessary litigation costs and 
imposing substantial burdens on the courts.66  Additionally, in contrast to 
the predictability of pro rata allocation, the all sums method compels 
insurers to account for the possibility that they will be held liable for 
damage or injury occurring beyond the policy period in calculating the 
premiums they charge.67 
V. HISTORICALLY, POLICYHOLDERS HAVE USED THE NON-
CUMULATION CLAUSE TO SUPPORT ALL SUMS LIABILITY 
By their plain terms, non-cumulation clauses limit the policyholder’s 
ability to recover for the same loss under multiple, successively issued 
policies.  Policyholders have sought to use these clauses to argue in favor 
of all sums liability, contending that the clauses reflect the insurers’ 
understanding that CGL policies cover liability for injury or damage 
taking place outside of the policy period.68 
A. Origins of the Non-Cumulation Clause 
Our understanding of the origins of the non-cumulation clause is 
consistent with Mr. French’s.  The initial purpose of the clause was to 
prevent policyholders from recovering under both accident- and 
occurrence-based policies for the same loss.69  Initially, following the 
transition from accident-based to occurrence-based policies, it was 
possible for both an earlier accident-based policy and a later occurrence-
based policy to apply to the same loss.70  This situation would arise when 
the cause of the injury or damage happened during the period of the 
earlier, accident-based policy, and the injury or damage itself happened 
during the period of the later, occurrence-based policy.71  Recognizing 
this problem, underwriters developed non-cumulation clauses, such as 
                                                 
 66.  Doherty, supra note 19, at 271. 
 67.  Id. at 271–72. 
 68.  See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 493–94 (Del. 2001) (explaining 
how the provision at issue “undercuts the rationale for pro rata allocation”); Viking Pump, Inc. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The other courts that have explicitly 
addressed this issue have found non-cumulation and prior insurance provisions to be evidence that 
the parties did not intend the pro rata method of allocation.”). 
 69.  French, supra note 9, at 387–88. 
 70.  Id. at 386–87. 
 71.  Id. 
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the one in London Market policy form “L.R.D. 60,” written in 1960 by 
Leslie R. Dew.72  Specifically, Mr. Dew sought to ensure that earlier 
policies written on the accident-based policy form would be required to 
pay before a later occurrence-based policy.73  Accordingly, the new 
clause precluded the policyholder from seeking coverage under both 
policies for a single claim.74  The non-cumulation clause in CGL policies 
typically reads as follows: 
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole 
or in part under any other excess policy issued to the Assured prior to 
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon as stated in Item 2 
of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due to the Assured 
on account of such loss under such prior insurance.75 
B. Policyholders’ Use of the Non-Cumulation Clause to Convince 
Courts to Adopt All Sums Liability 
In arguing for all sums liability under CGL policies for long-tail 
claims, policyholders have alleged, and continue to assert, that the non-
cumulation clause shows that insurance carriers understood these policies 
covered injury or damage happening outside their policy periods. 
For example, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, London was an environmental coverage dispute involving about 
fifty years of pollution caused by the policyholder’s lumber processing 
operations.76  In addressing the allocation of liability between the 
policyholder and the insurer, the court held that the non-cumulation 
provision would be superfluous if the drafters had intended that damages 
be allocated only among insurers based on their respective time on the 
risk.77 
Similarly, the court in Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Insurance Co. addressed 
an insurance coverage dispute involving forty-three insurers in 
connection with environmental actions involving decades of pollution 
from twenty manufacturing sites scattered across the United States.78  
                                                 
 72.  Id. at 386. 
 73.  See id. at 386 ([T]he drafters included the non-cumulation clause on the new LRD 60 
policy form to prevent a policyholder from obtaining a double recovery . . . .”). 
 74.  Id. at 386–87. 
 75.  See, e.g., Teck Metals, Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 735 F. Supp. 2d 
1231, 1238 (E.D. Wash. 2010); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, 797 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
 76.  797 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).  
 77.  Id. at 441. 
 78.  784 A.2d 481, 485 (Del. 2001). 
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The Hercules court held that the non-cumulation provision, which it 
specifically characterized as an all sums provision, extended coverage 
“beyond the policy period in the case of continuing damage.”79 
More recently, in Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indemnity Co., the 
Delaware Court of Chancery was tasked with addressing how to allocate 
damages for asbestos-related bodily injury taking place over many 
years.80  In concluding that all sums liability applied, the Viking Pump 
court asserted that the non-cumulation provision would apply when “the 
same occurrence gives rise to personal injury . . . which occurs partly 
before and partly within any annual period of this policy.”81  In its 
analysis of the non-cumulation clause, the Court of Chancery also 
concluded that such provisions “cannot be reconciled with the pro rata 
method of allocation.”82 
C. The Impact of the Non-Cumulation Clause in the All Sums Liability 
Context 
Over the years, policyholders have achieved limited success in 
convincing some courts to adopt the all sums approach.83  Having 
achieved this goal, however, insureds have belatedly realized that the 
non-cumulation provision, on which they often rely in arguing for all 
sums, can reduce or prevent recovery for long-tail claims in the all sums 
context. 
For example, consider the following hypothetical.  A policyholder 
has incurred $30 million in environmental liability due to six years of 
pollution at one of its plants.  For purposes of this hypothetical, over the 
years the policyholder obtained a mix of primary and excess insurance, 
with policy periods during the relevant pollution period.  The policies 
provide a total of $10 million in limits the first year, with those limits 
increasing up to $25 million by the sixth year: 
 
                                                 
 79.  Id. at 493–94. 
 80.  Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76, 107 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 81.  Id. at 122. 
 82.  Id. at 123. 
 83.  See, e.g., Hercules Inc., 784 A.2d at 489; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 
1058 (Ind. 2001); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 840 
(Ohio 2002); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993). 
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Under the pro rata approach, a court would simply divide the $30 
million by six, and assign one-sixth of the damages, or $5 million, to 
each policy year: 
 
Accordingly, the entirety of the liability would be covered with 
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However, under its plain language, the non-cumulation clause 
prevents the policyholder from doing this.  This is because the earlier 
policies cover the same loss under the all sums approach.  Accordingly, 
the limits of liability of the policies in later years are reduced by the 
amounts due for the loss from the policies issued in earlier years. 
To explain, the plain language of the non-cumulation clause requires 
the policyholder to initially recover under the policies with periods in the 
earliest year and work forward.  However, the clause reduces the limits 
of the policies in each succeeding year by the amounts due for the loss 
from the prior policies.  Accordingly, in this scenario, the policyholder 
would be entitled to $10 million under the Year 1 policies.  However, 
under the non-cumulation clause, this “amount due” reduces the limits 
available under the Year 2 policies to zero.  This same $10 million 
“amount due” also reduces the limits of the policies in Year 3 by $10 
million to $5 million.  Under the non-cumulation clause, the policyholder 
could then recover an additional $5 million under the Year 3 policies, or 
a total of $15 million.  However, the non-cumulation clause would then 
operate to reduce the limits of the policies in Year 4 (originally $20 
million) to $5 million, because the “amount due” under the prior policies 
is $15 million.  The clause would then permit the policyholder to recover 
an additional $5 million under the Year 4 policies, resulting in a total of 
$20 million.  However, under the non-cumulation clause, this “amount 
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$20 million) to zero.  The non-cumulation clause would also reduce the 
limits of liability available under the policies in Year 6 (originally $25 
million) to $5 million.  When the policyholder has recovered that sum, it 
has recovered $25 million.  However, at this point, the non-cumulation 
clauses have reduced the remaining available policy limits to zero: 
 
Having used the non-cumulation clause as an argument to support 
the all sums outcome in some jurisdictions, policyholders are now faced 
with the disconcerting fact that this same provision, if applied as written, 
may actually leave them worse off than they would have been if they had 
simply agreed to the pro rata approach in the first place. 
VI. POLICYHOLDER ATTEMPTS TO AVOID THE IMPACT OF THEIR PRIOR 
ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE NON-CUMULATION CLAUSE 
Policyholders have succeeded in obtaining all sums rulings from a 
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cumulation clause as a key argument.84  Having achieved their goal in 
these jurisdictions, however, policyholders and their attorneys have 
belatedly realized that enforcement of this clause can reduce their 
recoveries and now seek to avoid the logical outcome of their prior 
arguments concerning the non-cumulation clause.85 
This would appear to be the motivating factor behind Mr. 
Christopher French’s recent article, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An 
“Other Insurance” Clause by Another Name.86  In his article, Mr. French 
spends considerable space arguing that the non-cumulation clause is 
ambiguous in the all sums framework.  To summarize his primary 
arguments, Mr. French first asserts that the non-cumulation clause was 
specifically and narrowly designed solely to address the circumstance in 
which a prior accident-based policy and a subsequent occurrence-based 
policy cover the same loss.87  He then asserts that the drafters of the non-
cumulation clause did not contemplate subsequent developments in 
insurance law, such as the continuous trigger and all sums liability, at the 
time the clause was written in 1960.88  Mr. French next purports to 
illustrate the allegedly inconsistent application of the non-cumulation 
clause in the context of long-tail claims; according to Mr. French, several 
courts have rejected interpretations of the clause that would eliminate the 
policyholder’s recovery under various theories.89  In pro rata 
jurisdictions, for instance, Mr. French contends that courts have 
concluded that the application of the clause conflicts with pro rata 
allocation; however, in all sums jurisdictions, he asserts that courts have 
rejected the notion that there is an “amount due” under prior insurance 
where a policyholder’s liabilities span multiple policy periods, 
concluding that there is no amount due under prior insurance unless and 
until the policyholder presents a claim under those policies.90 
                                                 
 84.  See generally Part V. 
 85.   See, e.g., Cal. Ins. Co. v. Stimson Lumber Co., No. Civ. 01-514-HA, 2004 WL 1173185, 
at *32 (D. Or. May 26, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 325 F. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that the non-cumulation clause reduced the insurer’s policy limits by amounts paid in prior policy 
years or the amounts paid by other excess insurers where excess insurance coverage was available); 
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 176, 181–82 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(finding that a non-cumulation clause precluded policyholder from recovering more than one policy 
limit); Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that a non-
cumulation clause prevented a policyholder from seeking more than one year’s set of per-occurrence 
limits for a given occurrence). 
 86.  See French, supra note 9. 
 87.  Id. at 386–87. 
 88.  Id. at 387. 
 89.  Id. at 389–90. 
 90.  Id. at 391. 
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Mr. French further argues that the application of the non-cumulation 
clause would enable insurers to “escape” liability by “deflect[ing]” 
coverage responsibility to defeat a policyholder’s recovery.91  In support 
of this contention, Mr. French cites to case law in which courts in all 
sums jurisdictions have invalidated “other insurance” provisions 
appearing in successive policies.92 
In Mr. French’s view, the apparent inconsistencies in the application 
of the non-cumulation clause with respect to long-tail claims, as well as 
their purported incongruity under both the all sums and pro rata 
allocation approaches, necessarily render these clauses inherently 
ambiguous.93  In making these arguments, Mr. French focuses on isolated 
parts of the non-cumulation clause and brands them as ambiguous.94  Mr. 
French further contends that the clauses are unenforceable under the 
“reasonable expectations” doctrine, because a policyholder reasonably 
expects to recover for the entirety of a loss up to the policy limits 
(notwithstanding the presence of the non-cumulation clause in its 
policies).95  Consequently, according to Mr. French, the non-cumulation 
clause is “hopelessly ambiguous” and “contrary to the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder.”96 
Mr. French’s arguments simply ignore the fact that policyholders 
have repeatedly used the non-cumulation clause to argue in favor of all 
sums liability, contending that the clause proves that insurers have 
always understood that CGL policies cover injury or damage happening 
outside their policy periods.97  Now, faced with the results of the actual 
application of the clause in all sums jurisdictions, Mr. French seeks to 
avoid sleeping in the bed that the policyholders have made by claiming 
that those who drafted the clause did not anticipate developments like the 
continuous trigger and all sums liability, and arguing that non-
cumulation provisions apply only to continuous losses that begin in an 
accident-based policy period and continue into an occurrence-based 
policy period.98 
To put it bluntly, policyholders cannot have their cake and eat it too. 
If, as the policyholder bar has repeatedly contended, the non-cumulation 
                                                 
 91.  Id. at 391–92. 
 92.  Id. at 392. 
 93.  Id. at 377. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 402–03. 
 96.  Id. at 404. 
 97.  See supra Part V.B. 
 98.  French, supra note 9, at 388. 
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clause supports the all sums approach, then it applies under that 
approach.  If, on the other hand, the clause does not apply because its 
narrow purpose was to prevent recovery under both accident- and 
occurrence-based policies, then it is entirely irrelevant to the question of 
whether the all sums approach or pro rata allocation applies to coverage 
for long-tail claims. 
VII. APPLICATION OF THE NON-CUMULATION CLAUSE IN THE ALL SUMS 
CONTEXT 
A. The Non-Cumulation Clause Is Unambiguous 
Despite Mr. French’s claims to the contrary, the language of the non-
cumulation clause is clear and unambiguous.  The clause was crafted 
originally to address the situation in which both a prior accident-based 
policy and a subsequent occurrence-based policy applied to the same 
loss.  However, it was not written to limit its application only to that 
situation, although it would have been simple enough to have done so if 
that was its purpose.  Rather, the clause was written using language that 
applies generally to any situation in which both earlier and later policies 
cover the same loss, regardless of the reason. 
The ambiguities that Mr. French seeks to manufacture are 
inextricably tied to his apparent (and erroneous) presumption that the 
non-cumulation clause is irreconcilable with the all sums approach.  
Citing authority for the proposition that courts have deemed policy terms 
and provisions ambiguous where they are susceptible to “more than one 
reasonable meaning,” Mr. French asserts that the non-cumulation clause 
is ambiguous “when one attempts to apply [it] to long-tail liability 
claims.”99  What Mr. French ultimately suggests, however, is not that the 
clause itself is inherently ambiguous; rather, the purported ambiguities 
arise only under the premise that non-cumulation clauses are somehow, 
now, incompatible with the all sums approach, despite years of prior 
policyholder arguments that their existence supports the all sums 
approach.  At bottom, however, Mr. French’s arguments are based on the 
notion that difficulties in applying a contract provision render the 
provision ambiguous.  There is simply no support for that proposition.  In 
fact, precisely the opposite is true.100 
                                                 
 99.  Id. at 398. 
 100.  See, e.g., Drews Distrib., Inc. v. Leisure Time Tech., Inc., No. 97-2391, 1999 WL 183811, 
at *11–12 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1999) (observing that a contract is not ambiguous merely because it is 
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Moreover, courts across the nation have rejected the proposition that 
non-cumulation clauses are ambiguous, and have concluded that, by their 
plain language, these clauses apply under the all sums approach.101  For 
instance, in Stonewall Insurance Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
the court recognized that the non-cumulation clause applies in the all 
sums context and limits the amount a policyholder may seek from a 
subsequent excess insurer.102  Importantly, Stonewall recognized that 
ambiguities cannot be read into a non-cumulation clause by willfully 
divorcing its key terms from the context in which they appear in the 
                                                                                                                       
 
difficult to construe); Candid Corp. v. Assurance Co., No. CV054008138, 2007 WL 1120616, at *9 
n.5 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 29, 2007) (noting that difficulties in applying a particular contract 
provision to a given set of factual circumstances do not render the provision itself ambiguous); 
McCann v. Glynn Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 839, 845 (Ga. 1945) (noting that a contract is not 
ambiguous merely because it may be difficult to construe); Shivvers v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 589 
N.W.2d 129, 135 (Neb. 1999) (“[A]n otherwise unambiguous provision is not made ambiguous 
simply because it is difficult to apply to the facts of a particular case.” (quoting Quinlan v. Coombs, 
314 N.W. 2d 125, 128 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 101.  See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 341–44 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(enforcing a clear and unambiguous non-cumulation clause); Plantation Pipeline Co. v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., No. 1:0-CV-2811-WBH, 2008 WL 4737163, at *7 (N.D. Ga. July 31, 2008) (finding that the 
term “loss” in the non-cumulation clause is not ambiguous when viewed in the context of the 
clause’s remaining language); Cal. Ins. Co. v. Stimson Lumber Co., No. Civ. 01-514-HA, 2004 WL 
1173185, at *31–32 (D. Or. May 26, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 325 F. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 
2009) (adopting insurer’s construction of the term “loss” in the non-cumulation clause and enforcing 
the clause in favor of the insurer); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 
176, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (enforcing a non-cumulation clause that is clear in both content and title); 
O-I Brockway Glass Container v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 90-2797 (AET), 1994 WL 910935, 
at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 1994) (“[N]o confusion or ambiguity exists regarding the Non-Cumulation 
clause.  ‘[T]he words of an insurance policy should be given their ordinary meaning, and in the 
absence of an ambiguity, a court should not engage in a strained construction to support the 
imposition of liability.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 582 A.2d 
1257 (N.J. 1990))); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Civ. A. No. 86-
7501, 1989 WL 73656, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1989), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 25 F.3d 177 
(3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that there is no basis for failing to enforce the terms of the non-
cumulation provision); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1259 
(Del. 2010) (agreeing with the motion judge’s application of the unambiguous non-cumulation 
clause); Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 493–94 (Del. 2001) (applying a non-
cumulation clause and “all sums” provisions to determine insurance coverage); Viking Pump, Inc. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76, 127 (Del. Ch. 2009) (emphasizing that the language of the non-
cumulation clause works precisely in an “all sums” context); Hiraldo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 
563, 564–65 (N.Y. 2005) (enforcing a non-cumulation clause); Mark IV Indus. v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., No. 2005/2029, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1294, at *15 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 28, 2006) 
(holding that the ordinary language of the non-cumulation provision applied).  
 102.  996 A.2d 1254, 1259–60 (Del. 2010) (“Under the all sums approach, [the insured] may 
choose a single tower of coverage . . . from which to seek indemnity and defense costs.  After 
selecting a tower, coverage then proceeds up the tower from the first layer of coverage until full 
indemnity or complete exhaustion of the policy limits occurs.  In turn, the selected insurers may then 
seek contribution against other carriers from other towers . . . .  The non-cumulation clause does not 
create an ambiguity which alters this process.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).  
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policy, thereby “dishonor[ing] the spirit of the clause and improperly 
allow[ing] [the insured] to obtain a double recovery.”103  Similarly, in 
Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Insurance Co., the court recognized that non-
cumulation clauses do not apply in the context of pro rata allocation, but 
do apply under the all sums approach.104  Outboard Marine Corp. v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. echoed this principle, holding that non-
cumulation clauses are unenforceable in the context of pro rata 
allocation.105  Although Mr. French correctly recognizes that Outboard 
Marine rejected an interpretation of the non-cumulation clause that 
would reduce the policyholder’s recovery,106 this rejection was expressly 
limited to the context of pro rata allocation rather than all sums 
liability—because pro rata allocation limited each policy’s liability to 
damages happening during its policy period, no policy in any given year 
was being applied to the same loss as a prior policy.  Accordingly, by its 
terms, the non-cumulation clause did not apply under the pro rata 
allocation framework.107  Outboard Marine’s discussion in no way 
suggests that the non-cumulation clause would not apply under an all 
sums scheme, as Mr. French seems to suggest.  In fact, the contrary is 
true: if the clause does not apply under the pro rata approach because no 
policy is being held responsible for the same loss as an earlier policy, 
then it necessarily does apply under the all sums scheme, which clearly 
does hold later policies liable for the same loss as earlier policies. 
B. The Distinction Between Non-Cumulation and “Other Insurance” 
Clauses 
Mr. French’s attempt to analogize non-cumulation clauses to “other 
insurance” clauses disregards the clear differences in the purposes and 
application of these clauses.  Mr. French relies wholly on a superficial 
similarity between the two types of clauses, reasoning that, like other 
insurance clauses, “[n]on-cumulation clauses . . . purport to shift the 
liability for a loss from the policy at issue to other policies issued in prior 
                                                 
 103.  Id. at 1260. 
 104.  Hercules, Inc., 784 A.2d at 494–95.  In fact, this prevention of a double recovery aligns 
precisely with the original purpose of the clause.  See supra Part III. 
 105.  670 N.E.2d 740, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding it “illogical to enforce” non-cumulation 
clauses where there was a “continuous occurrence” that could be viewed as a separate occurrence for 
each policy receiving pro rata allocation). 
 106.  See French, supra note 9, at 389 (noting that the court in Outboard Marine considered 
applying the non-cumulation clause to be the same as double charging the insurer). 
 107.  Outboard Marine, 670 N.E. 2d at 750 (finding that the non-cumulation clause cannot be 
enforced if a pro rata allocation has been assessed). 
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years, so the same principles apply.”108  As an initial matter, an other 
insurance clause cannot be equated directly with a non-cumulation 
provision—both clauses exist independently of one another and use 
different terms and conditions.  Fundamental principles of contract 
construction require insurance contracts to be interpreted in their entirety, 
such that all terms and provisions are given effect.  Mr. French’s 
assertion that other insurance and non-cumulation clauses are the same 
renders one clause or the other mere surplusage, in violation of this 
cardinal principle.109 
In fact, other insurance clauses are conceptually different from non-
cumulation clauses.  Specifically, other insurance clauses often apply to 
concurrent coverage situations, in which two or more policies insuring 
the same time period cover the same loss.110  In contrast, non-cumulation 
clauses address the situation in which consecutive policies apply to the 
same loss.111 
                                                 
 108.  French, supra note 9, at 407.  
 109.  See Enter. Tools, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 799 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that “clauses must be read in context,” suggesting that an insurance contract must be read as 
a whole to determine what the parties reasonably intended by its terms); Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista 
N. Townhomes Ass’n, 969 P.2d 658, 660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (where possible, a court should 
interpret a contract in such a way as to reconcile and give meaning to all of its terms).   
  Several cases stand specifically for the proposition that all parts and clauses of a policy 
must be considered together to ascertain the extent to which one clause is explained, modified, or 
limited by the others.  See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 376, 386–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the same meaning to repeated terms); Peerless Ins. 
Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 384–85 (Me. 1989) (requiring contracts to be construed as a whole); 
Mont. Petroleum Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. Crumleys, Inc., 174 P.3d 948, 957 (Mont. 2008) 
(stating that policies must be read as a whole and the various parts reconciled). 
 110.  See, e.g., Schoenecker v. Haines, 277 N.W.2d 782, 783–84 (Wis. 1979).  
 111.  See, e.g., Swainston v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 774 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 2009) 
(citing 12 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 169:9 (3d ed. 1998)).  
Although the court in Swainston differentiates “other insurance” clauses and “stacking,” non-
cumulation clauses are often referred to as “anti-stacking” clauses, meaning that they prohibit an 
insured from “stacking” the limits of multiple policy years to maximize coverage.  See Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Treesdale Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the non-cumulation 
clause, like all anti-stacking clauses, does not eliminate coverage but simply provides that if a single 
occurrence gives rise to an injury during more than one policy period, only one occurrence limit will 
apply; as such, it is not an escape clause); Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 
2d 1071, 1082 (E.D. Wis. 2006), aff’d, 316 F. App’x 501 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The court finds 
significant the distinction between concurrent and successive policies. ‘Other insurance’ 
provisions . . . deal with the situation of concurrent coverage.  At issue in the present case is a ‘non-
cumulation’ provision, which is intended to address successive policies.”); Air Prods. & Chems., 
Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 86–7501, 1989 WL 73656, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 
1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that non-cumulation clause 
did not constitute an escape clause given that it sought only to limit, rather than preclude, the 
insurer’s liability for claims against its insured); Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 819 A.2d 410, 421 (N.J. 2003) (“Because it is well settled that an escape clause is a sub-species 
of other insurance . . . and because a non-cumulation clause is not an other-insurance clause, it 
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C. The Policyholder’s “Amounts Due” Argument is Flawed 
 As noted previously, Mr. French contends that there is no “amount 
due” under prior insurance unless and until the policyholder presents a 
claim under those policies.  Thus, according to Mr. French, the non-
cumulation clause does not apply unless and until such a claim is 
presented under these earlier policies.112  The fundamental flaw in this 
argument is that it is completely contrary to the all sums approach that 
the policyholders in these cases are espousing. 
Under the all sums scheme, the policyholder typically files a suit 
seeking coverage under all policies issued during the relevant injury or 
damage period, and asserts that all of those policies are jointly and 
severally liable for the loss at issue, subject to their limits of liability.  In 
other words, the very nature of the all sums theory means that the 
policyholder is asserting that there are “amounts due” for the loss under 
all policies, at the inception of the case. 
Additionally, Mr. French’s argument ignores the meaning of the 
word “due.”  Under the appropriate definition, “due” means “owed” or 
“owing as a debt.”113  Again, the very nature of the all sums argument is 
that all policies on the risk during the relevant timeframe owe coverage 
to the policyholder.  The notion that there are no “amounts due” under 
the earlier policies until the policyholder presents a claim therefore is 
directly contrary to the all sums theory and to the policyholders’ 
complaints in these cases. 
Moreover, this argument conflicts with Mr. French’s position that the 
purpose of the non-cumulation clause was to prevent an “accident-” 
based policy and an “occurrence-” based policy from covering the same 
                                                                                                                       
 
follows that a non-cumulation clause technically is not an escape clause.”).  The recent ruling in Mt. 
McKinley Insurance Co. v. Corning Inc., Index No. 602454/2002 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2012), 
rejected the application of a non-cumulation clause in the “all sums” context, but did so based on a 
misapprehension of the nature of the clause.  Attempting to distinguish the Delaware Chancery 
court’s holding in Viking Pump v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76 (Del. Ch. 2009), that non-
cumulation clauses applied in an “all sums” context, Corning emphasized the fact that the “other 
insurance” clauses at issue in the case before it applied only to concurrent coverage and, thus, did 
not mandate joint and several liability.  Mt. McKinley, Index No. 602454/2002, at 50.  The court 
implicitly grouped non-cumulation clauses and the “other insurance” clauses at issue together for 
purposes of its analysis, and in doing so erroneously assumed that non-cumulation clauses apply 
only in the concurrent coverage context.  Id.  
 112.  French, supra note 9, at 391. 
 113.  See Due, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
due (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
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loss.114  Nothing would prevent a policyholder from employing the same 
amounts due argument, which Mr. French seeks to employ in order to 
avoid application of the clause as between occurrence-based policies, in 
order to circumvent the clause in the very context in which he concedes 
it is designed to apply.115  If policyholders can select the order in which 
to target occurrence-based policies to avoid the non-cumulation clause, 
there is no reason that they could not do the same with respect to 
accident and occurrence policies—target the occurrence-based policy 
with a non-cumulation clause first, and then the earlier accident-based 
policy.  This argument thus leads to the very result that Mr. French 
concedes the non-cumulation clause was designed to prevent in the first 
place. 
In sum, the interpretation of when amounts are “due” that Mr. French 
advocates would allow a policyholder to unilaterally circumvent the non-
cumulation provision by manipulating the sequence in which it selects 
policy years to pay for a loss, thus rendering the provision meaningless.  
Various courts have rejected this argument on this basis.116 
D. The Non-Cumulation Clause and Pro Rata Allocation 
At bottom, many of the problems that Mr. French alleges with non-
cumulation clauses stem from the fact that the CGL policy language 
limits coverage to damages on account of injury or damage during the 
policy period.  When that limitation is honored—by pro rata allocation, 
for instance—then the non-cumulation clause does not apply, because no 
earlier policy is covering the same loss as a later policy; each policy is 
only insuring the loss attributable to the injury or damage happening 
during its policy period.  When the policy language is honored, the non-
cumulation clause might generally be relegated to the accident-based 
versus occurrence-based situation and, in any event, would not apply to 
long-tail claims.  Unfortunately, policyholders are the victims of their 
own, limited success in persuading certain jurisdictions to adopt the all 
sums approach.  In those jurisdictions, policyholders have succeeded in 
persuading the courts that the long-tail claim situation is precisely the 
                                                 
 114.  French, supra note 9, at 387–88. 
 115.  Id. at 391. 
 116.  See, e.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 176, 181–82 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the relevant non-cumulation clause was not ambiguous, and therefore 
plaintiff could not “stack”); O-I Brockway Glass Container, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 
90-2797 (AET), 1994 WL 910935, at *7–10 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 1994) (rejecting the policyholder’s 
argument that it could invoke coverage in reverse chronological order). 
2013] THE “NON-CUMULATION” CLAUSE 731 
same as the accident-based versus occurrence-based situation—earlier 
and later policies covering the same, undifferentiated loss.  Having 
converted the long-tail claim situation into precisely the same situation 
that gave rise to the non-cumulation clause, policyholders can hardly cry 
foul when the clause is applied to the situation that their arguments 
created.  This conclusion is borne out by the decisions addressing the 
application of non-cumulation clauses in pro rata allocation 
jurisdictions.117 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Courts have long contended with determining how best to apportion 
liability for long-tail claims.  Difficulties in proving the cause and 
progression of injury or damage with respect to such claims have sparked 
much debate.  To persuade the courts to maximize their recoveries by 
rejecting pro rata allocation, policyholders have contended that the 
existence of the non-cumulation clause demonstrates that CGL insurers 
contemplated all sums liability.  Now, in an attempt to undermine the 
application of the non-cumulation clause in that very same all sums 
context, Mr. French claims that those who drafted the clause did not 
anticipate certain developments, such as all sums liability, and argues 
that the clause applies only to continuous losses that implicate both 
accident-based and occurrence-based policies.  In so arguing, Mr. French 
disregards the fact that policyholders have repeatedly used the non-
cumulation clause to support their all sums arguments.  Under its plain 
terms, the clause applies generally to any situation in which both earlier 
and later policies cover the same loss, and several jurisdictions have 
applied the clause to reduce policyholders’ recoveries under the all sums 
regime.  Mr. French’s attempts to manufacture ambiguity in the clause 
stem solely from perceived difficulties in applying the clause to the all 
sums approach, and his arguments disregard the ample authority holding 
that the non-cumulation clause is unambiguous.  Nor can non-cumulation 
clauses be equated with other insurance clauses in light of clear 
differences in their purposes and application. 
                                                 
 117.  See Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009) (reasoning 
that after application of pro rata allocation, the “very premise upon which the [n]on-[c]umulation . . . 
provision[] [is] based is absent, because there is no common injury”); Outboard Marine Corp. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (declining to give effect to non-
cumulation clause under a pro rata allocation scheme); Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 819 A.2d 410, 422 (N.J. 2003) (explaining that once a court adopts pro rata allocation, the 
non-cumulation clause “drops out” of the policy). 
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Simply put, if, as policyholders contend, the non-cumulation clause 
supports an all sums approach, then it must apply under that approach.  If 
Mr. French is right, and the clause does not apply in the all sums context, 
then the clause does not support all sums liability in the first place. 
 
